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longed to marketing cooperative associations violated the equal
protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Al-
though the plaintiff's indignation at having to bear the entire
tax burden for advertising which benefits all sweet potato
farmers is understandable, the court's conclusion that there
was a reasonable basis for the classification between shippers
and growers and that the legislation was therefore constitutional
should not have surprised anyone in view of previous decisions
in the area of classification.82
PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE I
Cheney C. Joseph, Jr.*
MOTION TO SUPPRss
In State v. Wilkerson,' the supreme court held that the mo-
tion to suppress can be used to provide a pretrial determination
of the admissibility of identification testimony resulting from
a lineup. The court recognized that
"although a literal reading of Article 703 of the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure would seem to confine that motion to search
and seizure evidence and evidence of written confessions
and inculpatory statements, the motion is well attuned to
the relief sought in this case, we have sanctioned it, and
Article 3 of the Code provides authorization for the position
we have taken."
Article 3 authorizes courts to adopt procedures, although not
specifically created by legislation, which are "consistent with
the spirit of this Code."
In sustaining the use of the motion in cases involving iden-
tification evidence, it is submitted that the court did not require
that objections to identification procedures necessarily be raised
by pretrial motion to suppress. It merely sanctioned the use of
the motion in such instances. In State v. Walker,4 the defense
32. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146 (1930); State Dept. of Agric. v.
Sibille, 207 La. 877, 22 So.2d 202 (1945); State v. Arthur Duvic's Sons, 185
La. 647, 170 So. 23 (1936).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State Uniersity.
1. 261 La. 342, 259 So.2d 871 (1972).
2. Id. at 350, 259 So.2d at 873.
3. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 3.
4. 261 La. 545, 260 So.2d 618 (1972).
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contended that the trial judge erred in refusing to hear a motion
relative to the suppression of identification evidence. The error
complained of in Walker occurred prior to the decision in Wil-
kerson. The court did not decide whether it was or was not error
for the trial court to refuse to hear the motion to suppress in
advance of trial. Due to the facts of the case, the court simply
said "[i]f error was committed in not hearing the evidence as
to identification on the motion to suppress instead of at the trial,
such error was harmless and not cause for reversal."5
The same reasons for requiring that search and seizure and
written confession questions be decided prior to trial exist as
well in the case of identification evidence. As the court said in
State v. Lawrence," the reasons for requiring that defendant
test by pretrial motion the constitutionality of a search and
seizure are
"to eliminate from the trial before the jury all disputes over
police conduct unrelated to the guilt or innocence of the
accused; to avoid unwarranted delay of the trial and con-
fusion of the jury; to spare the State as well as the defense
the expense of a useless trial in cases where a purely legal
determination by the judge alone is required; to avoid the
necessity of a mistrial because the jury has been exposed to
unconstitutional evidence, with resulting repetitive litiga-
tion; and to afford the State and the accused advance knowl-
edge of the rules of evidence which must be followed during
the course of the trial."7
Trial judges should be encouraged to employ the pretrial
motion to suppress to eliminate the need to litigate identification
issues during trial. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the supreme
court should not require that objections be raised by pretrial
motion absent legislative amendment to article 703.
The supreme court also dealt with the issues involved in the
motion to suppress in State v. Gamier.8 The central question
was the validity of the seizure of a large sum of currency in
connection with the execution of a search warrant on an alleged
gambling operation. Gambling paraphernalia and currency in
5. rd. at 547, 260 So.2d at 619.
6. 260 La. 169, 255 So.2d 729 (1971).
7. Id. at 178-79, 255 So.2d at 732.
8. 261 La. 802, 261 So.2d 221 (1972).
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the amount of $10,971.75 were seized. The validity of the search
warrant was not attacked.9 The trial court however sustained
the motion. The defendant argued that police were only autho-
rized to seize gambling equipment and money actually used in
gambling operations. The money sought to be suppressed and re-
turned was found in a safe on the premises. 10 The supreme court
found that the trial court erred in concluding that because the
money seized would not be relevant, and hence inadmissable in
the gambling prosecution, the funds could not be subject to
lawful seizure as "evidence tending to prove commission of an
offense."1 1 The court said that "our procedure does not autho-
rize the use of the motion to suppress to test the admissibility
of evidence constitutionally seized.1 2 The provisions of R.S.
15:4118 were said not to "authorize the release of property law-
fully seized which the state intends to offer as evidence at the
trial .... ,,14 The court concluded that "questions of admissi-
bility, relevance, weight, and connexity are properly resolved
at ... trial on the merits" and "not by pretrial motion for the
property's return."15
While the relevance of evidence certainly should not nor-
mally be decided by pretrial motion, it is submitted that the
court's opinion sweeps too broadly. Article 161 does provide au-
thorization for the seizure of "evidence tending to prove the com-
mission of an offense"1 " as well as for the seizure of things which
are used or intended for use as means of committing offenses.
Thus, by its terms, that article does not authorize the seizure of
a thing (not the subject of a theft) which would not be evidence
tending to prove the commission of an offense and which could
not be used or intended for use as a means of committing an
9. The search warrant authorized state police to search certain described
premises and seize gambling equipment (dice tables, dice, gambling sUcks,
records, chips, money, roulette wheel and table, blackjack table, cards) and
various gambling paraphernalia being used in violation of LA. R.S. 14:90.
10. The closet in which the safe was located had a large quantity of
dice, playing cards and poker chips.
11. 261 La. 802, 807, 261 So.2d 221, 223 (1972); LA. CODS CalM. P. art 161(3).
12. 261 La. 802, 807, 261 So.2d 221, 223 (1972).
13. The article deals with disposition of property seized in connection
with criminal proceedings.
14. 261 La. 802, 807, 261 So.2d 221, 223 (1972).
15. Id.
16. LA. CODS CRIM. P. art 161 (3).
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offense. It is submitted that although the relevance of the thing
should not be, as the court said, the issue at a motion to suppress,
some relevance must be shown to justify the seizure.17
DIscovERY
Although standing by its steadfast refusal to extend full
pretrial discovery to defendants in criminal cases, the supreme
court ordered a trial court to permit the defense to conduct an
independent examination of alleged narcotics. In State v. Mig-
liore,18 writs were granted in which the district court was
ordered to specify "the time, place, and manner of making the
examination permitted and presenting such terms and condi-
tions as are just."19
Despite the supreme court's refusal to "adjudicate generally
-to the extent that prior jurisprudence would be overruled
. . . ,,,20 it clearly recognized the possibility that a constitutional
issue might be raised. Citing Jackson v. State21 and Clack v.
Reid,22 the court nevertheless refused to embrace the proposition
that denial of the right to conduct independent analysis might
deprive the defendant of due process of law. The court said
"since we see fit to grant defendant's motion for an Independent
Examination of Evidence, there is no necessity for us to discuss
the constitutional issues submitted."23
It is submitted that the result reached by the majority is
both fair and reasonable. Provided that there is a sufficient
quantity of the alleged narcotic substance, there is no reason
why an accused, upon order and direction of the trial court,
should not have a bona fide defense expert examine the evi-
dence.24 The fundamental issue may be whether or not the
matter in question is a controlled dangerous substance. Courts
17. For example, in a homicide investigation, had officers secured a
search warrant to look for and seize a murder weapon (pistol or knife) and
blood stained clothing; and had officers, while looking for these items, seen
and seized a diamond ring, such a seizure would not have been proper
unless the ring was in some respects relevant to the homicide investiga-
tions.
18. 261 La. 722, 260 So.2d 682 (1972).
19. Id. at 743, 260 So.2d at 689.
20. Id. at 742, 260 So.2d at 689.
21. 243 So.2d 396 (Miss. 1971).
22. 441 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1971).
23. 261 La. 722, 743, 260 So.2d 682, 689 (1972).
24. Certainly controlled dangerous substances should not be returned to
the accused himself.
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also should have the right to examine the credentials of the ex-
pert, to approve the location and type of examination to be
conducted, and to determine the quantity of the substance to
be examined by the expert.
25
When the examination of other physical evidence could not
impair the State's presentation, trial courts should not be hesi-
tant to authorize reasonable requests for examination by defense
experts. No one questions the right of a defendant to produce
expert testimony at his trial. The independent examination im-
plements that right without creating a substantial risk of de-
struction of or tampering with state evidence.26 The allowance
of examination by experts employed by the defendant under
court controlled conditions does not upset the "vital considera-
tions related to fair balance in criminal procedure and the pro-
tection of the public against the ravages of crime. '21
25. As the supreme court in MigZtore, 261 La. 722, 260 So.2d 682 (1972),
indicates, the quantity of narcotics held by the state is a relevant factor
in deciding whether or not and under what circumstances and conditions
the defense expert can study the questioned substance. For example, cases
might present themselves in which the defense expert would be required
to conduct the examination at the police laboratory.
26. Trial courts could reasonably require defense experts to wait until
state experts had completed their tests and study of physical evidence.
Courts could also require that the defense experts conduct their examina-
tion (for example of handwriting or finger prints or firearms) at the nearest
police crime laboratory. Many steps could be taken to protect the state's
evidence from being lost or tampered with.
27. State v. Hunter, 250 La. 295, 195 So.2d 273 (1967). This language is
cited in State v. Migliore, 261 La. 722, 724, 260 So.2d 682, 690 (1972). However,
in State v. Jones 4 McManus, No. 51,755 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 4
Oct. 1972), the Court affirmed the trial court's denial of a defense motion for
production of physical evidence. The Court said: "This case does not in-
volve, as in State v. Miglore, 261 La. 722, 260 So.2d 682 (1972), the possession
of a substance which is criminal merely by virtue of its chemical com-
position."
Dissenting, Justice Barham said: "Bill of Exceptions No. 2 was reserved
when defendant was denied access to physical evidence including hand-
prints and fingerprints, which he sought in order that he might have ex-
perts of his own choosing examine it in preparation for testifying. The
majority does not even meet the issue raised by this bill as presented and
argued by both the defense and the State. I am of the opinion that State
v. MigZtore, 261 La. 722, 260 So.2d 682, permits examination of physical evi-
dence under orders and guidance of the court for protection and preserva-
tion of that evidence. There is no reason why Migliore should be restricted
to narcotics. Examination of physical evidence is not discovery. Hand-
writing, ballistics, and fingerprint experts differ as do most expert wit-
nesses, and the only means by which the defendant can defend against
expert testimony by the State is to offer expert testimony of his own. I
am of the opinion that Bill No. 2 is good insofar as it addresses itself to
denial of access to the defendant for examination of physical evidence."
